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<A>Abstract 
Declining mortality followed by declining fertility over the demographic transition initially 
produce decades of rising child dependency, then decades of improving support ratios 
as child dependency falls (the "first dividend" which raises per capita consumption, other 
things equal), and finally population aging. India and ASEAN are in the first dividend 
period; China and Korea are near its end; and Japan's population is aging.  
 Between 2008 and 2050, Japan's support ratio will decline by 25%; Korea's by 
22%; China's by 14%; and India's and ASEAN's will rise. Population aging and the 
forces leading to it can produce not only frightening declines in support ratios, but also 
very substantial increases in productivity and per capita income by raising physical and 
human capital intensity. Longer life, lower fertility, and population aging all raise the 
demand for wealth to provide for old age consumption. This raises capital per worker 
(the "second dividend") despite declining aggregate saving rates, unless the increased 
demand for wealth is met through increased familial or public pension transfers for old 
age support: institutions and policies matter. Lower fertility and mortality are associated 
with higher human capital investment per child, also raising labor productivity. Together, 
these positive changes will likely outweigh the problems of declining support ratios as 
population ages. 
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Asian countries, like other countries around the world, are in the midst of a systematic 
series of demographic changes known as the demographic transition, driven by 
declining fertility and mortality. In addition to declining fertility and mortality, the 
demographic transition involves changes in population size, growth rate and age 
distribution. Populations start and end with similar total dependency ratios, but before 
the transition the dependents are primarily children and at the end they are primarily the 
elderly.  
 Although children and the elderly are both referred to as dependents, they differ 
in a very important way.  Children rely almost exclusively on transfers to the fill the large 
gap between what they consume and what they earn.  The elderly, in contrast, rely on a 
combination of transfers and lifecycle saving to fill the gap between what they consume 
and what they earn.  Thus, aging – and the anticipation of aging – can lead to an 
enormous increase in transfers and/or assets. 
 For this reason, the shift in the structure of dependency from children to the 
elderly has large potential consequences for the accumulation of physical capital and 
human capital, as we shall consider in some detail as our main theme. Closely related to 
this theme is important role of institutional arrangements governing intergenerational 
transfers which interact with changing population age distributions and motivation for old 
age support. Depending on these institutions, population aging may either drive a vast 
accumulation of implicit debt in public transfer systems for health and retirement, or it 
may generate a greater accumulation of assets raising incomes and perhaps labor 
productivity depending on whether assets are accumulated domestically or abroad.  
 This is not the place to discuss the causes of changing fertility and mortality, but 
it will be helpful to begin by considering the general form of changes over a classic 
demographic transition, as done in Figure 1. The figure shows actual historical and 
projected data for India from 1890 to 2100 along with simulated outcomes based on 
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parameterized curves for fertility and mortality. The purpose of the simulated outcomes 
is to emphasize the systematic and regular aspect of the changes shown which result 
from the broad qualitative features of the transition and are not special to the Indian 
context. This stylized transition will then serve as a template for placing the transitions in 
Asia into a broader context.  
<Figure 1 about here> 
 We see in Figure 1 that the mortality decline in India began early in the 19th 
Century while fertility did not begin to decline until around 1960. A lag of this sort 
between the inception of mortality and fertility decline is typical of demographic 
transitions, although the length of the lag is often shorter and there have been some 
exceptions. During the lag period the rate of population growth accelerates, here from 
less than a half percent per year to over two percent per year, and then decelerates after 
fertility begins its decline. Population size rises markedly, here by a factor of five or six 
from 1900 to the present, with substantially more increase yet to come.  
 The last panel in the figure summarizes the changes in the age distributions by 
plotting the youth and old age dependency ratios, defined conventionally as the ratio of 
the populations 0-14 or 65 and over to the working age population aged 15 to 65. The 
first notable change is the rise in the child dependency ratio as mortality declines while 
fertility remains high. As mortality declines, more children survive raising the ratio, much 
as would happen if fertility were to rise. The increase is evidently quite substantial. Only 
when fertility begins to decline after 1960 does the youth dependency and total 
dependency begin to fall, and this decline continues for fifty to sixty years. This phase of 
declining total dependency corresponds to a rising proportion of the population in the 
working ages which raises per capita income, other things equal, as we will discuss at 
length later. This boost to per capita income is called the first demographic dividend. 
Around 2015 this phase comes to an end as rising old age dependency first offsets and 
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then outweighs the decline in child dependency. Population aging now raises total 
dependency which continues its ascent until 2060 or so in this simulation, which 
assumes that fertility declines until replacement level at 2.1 births per woman and 
assumes that mortality decline ceases when a life expectancy of 80 is reached. It is 
entirely possible that fertility might continue to decline to the lower levels seen 
throughout much of East Asia, and that life expectancy may continue to rise, so that 
population aging continues to higher levels more similar to those expected for Japan and 
Korea. 
 We will be considering some of the consequences of this series of demographic 
changes for economic growth. To summarize, the first dividend stage presents an 
opportunity to convert the transient gains into long term progress through investment. 
Low and declining fertility has been widely associated with increased investments in 
human capital, which is one such investment. In various ways, the demographic 
changes driving the transition should greatly increase the aggregate demand for wealth, 
raising saving rates and leading to increased capital intensity in the aggregate economy. 
However, this response is not automatic. To the extent that old age consumption is 
funded through intergenerational transfers, either private, through the family, or public, 
through pension and health care systems, this boost to capital accumulation will be 
diminished. Each of these points provides leverage for policy intervention. 
 Whether countries will rely on transfers or assets to fund the needs of a growing 
elderly population will depend on policies, culture, and institutions.   As compared with 
European and Latin American countries, Asia has relied less on public PAYGO pension 
programs, although the situation is somewhat different in Japan (Ogawa et al. this 
conference).  But health care for the elderly is a large and increasing cost that is often 
heavily subsidized by the public sector.  Moreover, familial transfers to the elderly may 
be very important in Asia, and these are similar to PAYGO pension programs in some 
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important respects.  Thus, aging in Asia may lead to large implicit debts that are shared 
by taxpayers and the adult children of elderly. 
 If the needs of a growing elderly population are met through greater reliance on 
lifecycle saving, population aging will lead to an increase in assets with favorable 
implications for economic growth.  Previous studies and the analysis presented below 
show that through this mechanism changes in age structure can lead to a second 
demographic dividend – higher standards of living that persist long after the favorable 
effects of the first dividend have ended.  
 The economic effects are not confined by national borders.  Divergent 
demographic trends in the region are likely to generate international capital flows from 
those countries experiencing the most rapid increase in saving rates to countries which 
are aging more slowly (but have rapidly growing labor forces).   
 Some countries in Asia have experienced very rapid transitions.  Japan, Korea, 
China and some members of ASEAN are examples of countries in which changes in age 
structure are particularly dramatic.  Moreover, the timing of the demographic transitions 
varies across the region.  Japan is furthest along, while India and some ASEAN 
countries are relatively early in the transition.  As a consequence, the impact of age 
structure for any particular decade varies considerably from country to country.  
Moreover, the differences in the transition create the demographic divergence that leads 
to differences in factor ratios with implications for trade, foreign investment, and 
immigration.   
 The remainder of this paper addresses these issues in more detail.  In keeping 
with the approach of this study, we contrast the experiences and prospects in Japan, 
Korea, India, ASEAN, and greater China – consisting of the PRC, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan (also referred to as China+ below).  Demographic trends are discussed in 
Section I. 
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 The economic implications of demographic changes are addressed in section II 
following the broad outlines discussed in the introduction. We discuss research on the 
relationship between population and economics and we present a new analysis of how 
demographic change will influence key macroeconomic variables in ASEAN, greater 
China, India, Japan and Korea. 
<A>I. Demographic Change in Asia 
<B>Demographic Transition and Population Growth 
In the middle of the 20th Century birth rates were high in every Asian country but Japan.   
Death rates had begun to decline in a number of Asian countries leading to more rapid 
population growth and to increasing proportions of children because the declines in 
mortality were concentrated at young ages. In terms of the transition shown in Figure 1, 
some of these countries in 1950 were in the late stages of rising youth dependency and 
others were in the stage of fertility decline and the first dividend.  
 Except in Japan birth rates were generally around 40 births per 1000 population 
in 1950-55 while death rates as low as 10 per 1000 population in Japan and as high as 
25 per 1000 in China and India (United Nations, 2007).  The rate of natural increase 
(RNI), the difference between the birth rate and the death rate, is the rate at which the 
population would grow with no net immigration.  The RNI was high in 1950-55, varying 
from around 20 to 25, that is, 2 to 2.5% per year (see Figure 2). 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 During the next 50 years death rates declined very substantially.  By 2000-05, 
the death rate was near or below 10 per 1000 in every country, while birth rates also 
declined.  In some countries the birth rate declined by more than the death rate slowing 
population growth, but growth rates remained near 2 percent per year or more in many 
countries in 1975-80.  By 2000-05, however, further declines in the birth rate are 
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apparent in Figure 2.  In Japan, births and deaths were nearly equal during this period.  
In other countries population growth ranged from near 0 to almost 2 percent per year.  
 Figure 2 also shows UN Medium projections through 2050 which assume that in 
countries with very low fertility, e.g., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, 
and Singapore, it will rise in the future and that in countries with relatively high fertility, 
e.g., the Philippines and India, it will decline further (UN 2007).  The implied variation in 
population growth rates lies between minus and plus one percent per year. Death rates 
will rise moderately in many countries as their populations age, reflecting the 
deficiencies in the Crude Death Rate as a measure of mortality.  
 The broad outlines of the demographic transition are similar across Asia, but 
speed and timing vary.  The transition began first in Japan, then in other East and 
Southeast Asian countries, and more recently in some ASEAN countries and India.  It 
has been very rapid in Korea and China as compared with countries elsewhere in Asia, 
other parts of the developing world, or in Western countries.   
 Population growth rates are reported for ASEAN, greater China, India, Japan, 
and Korea in Table 1.  For 2000-05, Japan’s population growth was almost zero.  The 
PRC and Taiwan had population growth rates well below one percent per annum.  
Among the ASEAN countries only Thailand and Myanmar were growing at less than 1 
percent per annum.  Two Asian countries had birth rates that would have been well 
below 10 were it not for substantial rates of immigration – Singapore and Hong Kong, 
China.  The population growth rates for 2000-05 of other ASEAN countries vary from 1.3 
percent in Indonesia to 2.3 percent in Brunei.   India’s growth rate is moderately high at 
1.6 percent per year for 2000-05. 
<Table 1 about here> 
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 Because of differences in population growth rates, the populations of ASEAN and 
India are increasing relative to China, Japan, and South Korea.  India’s population is 
projected to exceed greater China’s population by 2030 (Figures 3 and 4).   
<Figure 3 about here> 
<Figure 4 about here> 
<B>Population Age Structure 
Population age structure changes in a very predictable way over the demographic 
transition.   Early in the transition, the percent children increases as infant and child 
mortality declines, as we saw in Figure 1.  Later the child share declines and the percent 
in the working ages increases.  In the final stages the share of the working age 
population declines while the share at old ages increases.   
 The rise in the child share of the population occurred in ASEAN, China, and India 
between 1950 and 1975.  In ASEAN, for example, the percent under age 20 increased 
from 49.0% to 53.0% (Table 2).  The decline in the proportion under age 20 has been 
extraordinarily rapid in some Asian countries such as greater China and South Korea.  In 
1975, just over 50 percent of South Korea’s population consisted of children under the 
age of 20.  The projected value for 2025 is 16.8 percent.   
<Table 2 about here> 
 The low level reflects the fact that South Korea has among the lowest total 
fertility rates of any country in the world. Other countries in which the child share is 
expected to drop to very low levels over the coming decades are Singapore, China, 
Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and Japan. 
 The percentage of the population in the working ages, defined here as those 
between age 20 and 64 inclusive, increased between 1975 and 2000 in every member 
of greater China, India, Japan, Korea, and every ASEAN country but Cambodia and Lao 
PDR.   The percentage reached 60 percent or more in Singapore, Thailand, greater 
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China, Japan, and Korea.  These countries are at or near the peak and will not 
experience any substantial change in the share of their working age population between 
2000 and 2025.  Japan is an exception and it will experience a significant decline in the 
working-age share and size (Table 3).  
<Table 3 about here> 
 The largest increases in the working-age populations are occurring in ASEAN 
and India.  Between 2000 and 2025 the working-age share will increase 7 percentage 
points in ASEAN and almost 9 percentage points in India.  Within ASEAN, the gains will 
be dramatic in Cambodia (13 points), Lao PDR (14 points), and Viet Nam (11 points).   
 Population aging is coming very rapidly to the countries of East Asia.  Japan, with 
the percentage 65 and older increasing from 17.2 in 2000 to 29.5 in 2025, has the oldest 
population in the world.  The percentage 65 and older will double between 2000 and 
2025 in greater China, from 6.9 percent to 13.8 percent, and in Thailand, from 6.7 
percent to 14.9 percent.  Even more rapid aging will occur in Singapore and Korea 
where 22.8 percent and 19.6 percent of the populations are projected to be 65 and older 
by 2025 (Table 4).     
<Table 4 about here> 
 Elsewhere the share of the population 65 and older will not reach 10 percent until 
after 2025.  By 2050, however, the ASEAN share is projected to reach 17.7 percent and 
India’s share 14.5 percent.   At first glance demographic characteristics in 2050 may 
appear to be remote to the economic concerns of today.  Nothing could be further from 
the truth, however.  The elderly population of 2050 is the working population of today.   
The prospect of old-age and retirement will influence current behavior – with respect to 
saving, for example.  Moreover, policies implemented by governments today will 
determine the success with which the working population of today can adequately 
prepare for an extended period of old age, and the ways in which they prepare.   
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<B>Role of Immigration1 
Immigration plays a relatively modest role in determining population growth and age 
structure in Asia as compared with births and deaths.  Immigrant flows are heavily 
regulated and limited – mostly by receiving countries.  With a few exceptions the 
countries of Asia have not opened their borders to immigrants and there is little to 
suggest that will change soon irrespective of economic or demographic pressures that 
may emerge in the coming years. 
 Asia’s largest countries are net sending countries.  Net migration from India, 
China, Indonesia, and the Philippines has consistently been negative (outward).  The 
rate of net migration is quite small in India and China and, thus, has little effect on the 
size of their national populations.  In 2000-2005, for example, China lost 0.03 percent 
per year of its population and India lost 0.02 percent per year of its population due to 
immigration.  The rate of out-migration from Indonesia and the Philippines is relatively 
great as compared with most other countries - .09 percent per year in Indonesia and 
0.23 percent per year in the Philippines.  But even in these two countries, the impact on 
the growth of the population in any year is modest (Table 5). 
<Table 5 about here> 
 These four countries do contribute relatively large shares to global migration 
flows because their populations are so large.  For 2000-2005 the annual net numbers of 
immigrants were 390,000 from China, 280,000 from India, 200,000 from Indonesia, and 
180,000 from the Philippines.  Combined they contributed just over 1 million net 
immigrants a year to the global flow.  This compares with a total outflow of 2.6 million per 
year from the less developed regions to the more developed regions of the world during 
the same period.   
                                                
1 Estimates presented in this section are all drawn from two sources:  United Nations 2006.  
International Migration 2006; and United Nations 2006. World Population Prospects 2006.  
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 For the most part these immigrants were not moving to other Asian countries.  
Total net inflows, including immigrants from outside Asia, were approximately 100,000 
immigrants per year to the net receiving countries of ASEAN, 60,000 per year for Hong 
Kong, and only 54,000 per year for Japan. 
 For a few countries in the region migration is significant relative to their domestic 
populations.  The Philippines has sustained immigrant outflows at a significant level for 
many years.  As a consequence, remittances are currently about 13% of GDP.  Hong 
Kong, Brunei, and Singapore have actively encouraged immigration to their countries.  
Over 40 percent of Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s populations and one-third of Brunei’s 
population are immigrants.   
 Japan falls at the other end of the immigration spectrum with its relatively closed 
borders.  Given the high wages of its workers relative to those of its neighbors and the 
declining numbers in the working ages, one might well expect substantial immigration 
into Japan.   Currently about 2 million immigrants live in Japan or 1.6% of its population.  
This compares with an immigrant share for the “more developed regions” of the world of 
9.5% and a figure of 12.9% for the US population. 
<A>II. Economic and Social Implications 
Demographic change in general, and the demographic transition in particular, has three 
broad kinds of economic consequence. First, the support ratio is altered, such that 
output produced by the working age population must be shared with differing numbers of 
children and elderly. During the phase of the transition when fertility is falling, rising 
support ratios boost the growth rate of per capita income or consumption, other things 
equal, and this is called the “first demographic dividend”. Second, the process of capital 
accumulation is affected, since both longer life and fewer children lead to higher savings 
in preparation for retirement, while population aging increases the relative number of 
wealth-holding elderly in the population. The combined effect raises the aggregate 
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capital-labor ratio and therefore labor productivity, generating the so-called “second 
demographic dividend”. However, the extent to which this happens depends on the 
extent to which income of the elderly is derived from public or familial transfers rather 
than private saving, and the degree of openness of the economy influences the extent to 
which labor productivity is raised domestically or in other countries. In any event, 
although the capital-labor ratio increases, the rate of saving out of GDP may decrease 
as populations age. Third, both lower fertility and higher survival lead to increased 
human capital investment per child. While the support ratio falls, rises, and then falls 
again over the demographic transition, the accumulation of physical and human capital 
per capita rises permanently, at least once fertility begins to fall. We will consider each of 
these three kinds of effect in more detail drawing on information about the economic life 
cycle for various Asian countries from the National Transfer Accounts project.2  
 Population change has important implications for individual countries, but also for 
regional economies and regional integration.  First, national and regional populations are 
growing at very different rates, with India and ASEAN increasing relative to greater 
China, Japan, and Korea.  Inevitably changes in the size of populations influence the 
size of regional economies.  More people means more consumers, more workers, and 
more savers and investors.   The extent to which larger populations result in greater 
aggregate consumption, aggregate earners, aggregate saving and investment will be 
influenced by a host of factors beyond the size of national and regional populations.  
None the less, population size is an important consideration.   
 National and regional differences in the growth of consumer demand, labor 
forces, and aggregate saving and investment will influence international flows of workers, 
                                                
2 The National Transfer Accounts (NTA) project uses new methods to construct measures of the 
flows of resources across ages through the public sector and through the private sector, including 
within families. Estimates are consistent with National Income and Product Accounts. Currently 
25 countries in Asia, the Americas, Europe and Africa are participating in the project. More 
information is available at www.ntaccounts.org. 
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goods and services, and capital.  The classic approach to this issue is that international 
flows arise in response to international differences in relative factor endowments 
(Deardorff 1987).  In this context a key issue is whether divergent population trends lead 
to divergent factor endowments.  
 The impact of divergent factor endowments will depend to a great extent on the 
institutional context.  Divergent capital-labor ratios can lead to immigration, capital flows, 
and/or trade depending on the policy context.  As should be clear from the brief 
description in the preceding section, international labor flows are relatively limited in Asia.  
In the absence of radical changes in policy, population aging is more likely to influence 
international capital flows and trade than immigration. 
<B>The Economic Lifecycle 
The economic lifecycle is fundamental to understanding the relationship between 
population age structure and the economy.   In all populations there are extended 
periods of dependency.  Children consume more resources than they produce through 
their own labor and must rely heavily on intergenerational transfers from their parents 
(and grandparents) and from taxpayers.  The elderly also consume more than they 
produce. They rely on intergenerational familial and public transfers, but also on 
personal assets to fill the gap between what they consume and what they produce 
through their own labors. 
 Figure 5 is an estimate of the economic lifecycle based on analysis of 
consumption and labor income data for four developing economies.   The figure is a 
cross-sectional profile constructed from per capita measures of labor income and 
consumption by single year of age.  The values are normalized on average labor income 
of adults aged 30-49.  Labor income includes all pretax returns to labor:  earnings, 
benefits, and self-employment income, estimated as a proportion of the operating 
surplus or mixed income of the household sector.  The age profiles are based on 
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nationally representative household surveys of income and adjusted to match National 
Income Account data.   
 Labor income is a composite.  It includes the labor income of both men and 
women.  It is influenced by labor force participation rates, by variation in hours worked, 
and by variation in wages for employees and productivity for the self-employed. Earnings, 
which can be measured with relative accuracy, is a dominant share of labor income in 
developed countries,  However, self-employment income, which is poorly measured, is a 
substantially large share of labor income in low-income countries.  
 Consumption includes both public and private consumption.  Private 
consumption of health, education, and other goods and services has been estimated 
separately from nationally representative surveys of consumption.  Public consumption 
has also been estimated separately for education, health, and other publicly provided 
goods and services.  Private and public consumption have also been adjusted to match 
NIPA values.3 
 One must avoid interpreting these figures as longitudinal or cohort profiles rather 
than as cross-sectional profiles.  In a growing economy with these cross-sectional 
profiles, labor income will rise more steeply for young cohorts, peak at a later age, and 
decline more slowly for the elderly.  Consumption will not be flat for a cohort – rather it 
will rise with age at a rate roughly equal to the rate of aggregate per capita consumption 
growth.   
 The age at which children become economically independent is surprisingly old.  
Children under age 25 are producing less than they consume.  Likewise, old age 
dependency occurs at a surprisingly early age.  Those 60 and older are producing less 
                                                
3 Detailed information about the methodology is available in Lee, R. D., S.-H. Lee, et al. (2007). 
Charting the Economic Lifecycle. Population Aging, Human Capital Accumulation, and 
Productivity Growth, a supplement to Population and Development Review  33. A. Prskawetz, D. 
E. Bloom and W. Lutz. New York, Population Council and at www.ntaccounts.org.  
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from their labor than they consume.  The lifecycle surplus is confined to 34 years – from 
ages 25 to 59.   
 The extent of dependency varies across the dependent ages, however.  Those in 
their early twenties are producing almost as much as they consume as are those in their 
early sixties.  Young children produce nothing, but they also consume much less than a 
teenager or someone over the age of 60.   
 An important issue is whether the economic lifecycle is changing over time, and 
how, and whether it is susceptible to policy.  The potential for policy intervention is 
discussed in the conclusions to the paper.  An important possibility that is widely 
discussed is that the age at retirement will increase as health improves and lifecycle 
expectancy rises.   This may happen and in a few industrial countries including the US, 
labor force participation rates have risen slightly at older ages in recent years.  For the 
most part, however, the age at retirement has declined dramatically around the world.  
For example, the median age at retirement of US men was above 74 in 1900 and is now 
around 63. This is a typical kind of change for industrial nations, although Japan has 
been different.  The labor income profile for the US and Taiwan have become 
increasingly concentrated declining for both the young and the old relative to prime age 
adults.  Another possibility is that the consumption side of the economic lifecycle will 
change.  Our preliminary analysis suggests that this may be occurring – consumption is 
rising most steeply at older ages in the industrial countries and particularly in the US 
consumption of the elderly has increased very sharply.  In the analysis presented below 
we abstract from these changes.  If we were to incorporate them, however, they would 
reinforce our conclusions.   
 The subsequent sections will make extensive use of the economic lifecycle to 
provide a more refined measure of how changes in population age structure will 
influence trends in consumption, labor, and their magnitudes relative to one another. 
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<B>The First Dividend 
Recent studies on the macroeconomic effects of population age structure are based on 
growth models that explicitly incorporate population age structure.  The simplest form for 
these models distinguishes two components of per capita income: 
 
Y L Y
N N L
= . (1) 
 
The exact definitions of the terms vary across studies, but broadly speaking Y/N is per 
capita income, L/N is the share of the population in the working ages – also called the 
support ratio, and Y/L is income per worker or working age person.  Letting gr, represent 
the growth rate, equation (1) can also be expressed as:  
 
Y L Ygr gr gr
N N L
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (2) 
 
Equation (2) identifies two channels through which population can influence per capita 
income.  First, the support ratio varies with changes in the population age structure.  
Given the rate of growth in Y/L, a one percentage point increase in the support ratio 
yields a one percentage point increase in per capita income.  This effect is referred to as 
the accounting effect or the first dividend.  Note that equation (2) is an identity and, 
hence, given output per effective consumer, changes in the support ratio must produce 
point-for-point changes in output per effective consumer.  A comprehensive 
understanding requires that we explore the second channel, as well, how changes in 
population age structure, other population changes, and non-demographic factors 
influence productivity growth, i.e., the growth of Y/L.   
 Elaborations on this simple formulation have been used to study population and 
economic growth using three approaches.  First, aggregate panel data have been used 
to estimate growth models, usually adapting equation (2) to a Barro-type growth 
framework (Kelley and Schmidt 1995; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom and Canning 
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2001; Kelley and Schmidt 2001; Kelley and Schmidt 2007).  A second approach relies 
on growth accounting methods (Mason 2001).  A third method uses simulation modeling 
(Cutler, Poterba et al. 1990; Mason 2005; Attanasio, Kitao et al. 2006; Mason and Lee 
2006; Mason 2007). 
 A simple refinement of this formulation incorporates the age variation in the 
economic lifecycle into the calculation of the support ratio.  In this formulation, L is the 
effective labor force calculated using the age-profile of labor income to weight the 
population age distribution.  The effective labor force then incorporates age variation in 
labor force participation, hours worked, and productivity.  The denominator N should also 
incorporate age variation in consumption to measure the effective number of consumers.  
Thus, if income per effective consumer, Y/N, increases by 1 percent the per capita age 
profile of consumption in Figure 5 can increase by 1 percent holding the consumption 
ratio (the ratio of aggregate consumption to national income) constant.  To be explicit, 
the effective number of producers, L, and the effective number of consumers, N, are 
defined to be:   
 
( ) ( ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( , )
x
x
L t x P x t
N t x P x t
γ
α
=
=
∑
∑
 (3) 
 
where P(x,t) is the population aged x in year t, ( )xγ  is the age-profile of labor income, 
and ( )xα  is the age-profile of consumption.  Both age-profiles are held constant over 
time.4  The support ratio is defined as the ratio L(t)/N(t).  
<Figure 5 about here> 
 The economic support ratio for five countries/groups from 1950 to 2050 is plotted 
in Figure 6.  Japan’s support ratio has peaked and is beginning to decline, but for all 
                                                
4 An interesting and important question is how the economic lifecycle changes over time and how 
that will influence the analysis presented here.   
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others in Asia the economic support ratio is rising and thus contributing to more rapid 
growth in income per effective consumer.  The impact of the economic support ratio 
does not depend on its level; its effect on income per effective consumer – the first 
dividend - is determined by the growth rate of the support ratio (Figure 7).   
<Figure 6 about here> 
<Figure 7 about here> 
 Figure 7 presents the first dividend for 1990 to 2025.  In the early 1990s the first 
dividend was turning negative in Japan, increasingly so as time progressed.  By 2025 
the decline in the economic support ratio will be depressing growth in income per 
effective consumer by 0.5% per year.   
 The experiences of greater China and South Korea are similar with the first 
dividend marginally larger in greater China in each year.  In the early 1990s, the first 
dividend added about 1 percent per year to growth in income per effective consumer.  
The impact has declined steadily.  It is still positive, but will soon disappear and after 
2020 will depress growth by 0.5% per year.  In India and ASEAN the dividend is positive 
for the entire 35 year period.  Currently, the increase in the economic support ratio is 
adding approximately 0.5 percent per year to growth in income per effective consumer.  
Over the period 1990 to 2025, the first dividend has raised income per effective 
consumer in total by 21 percent in ASEAN and by 18 percent in India.    
 Changes in the economic support ratio emphasize the implications of population 
age structure for per capita values.  The changes in total number of effective consumers 
and producers are also of interest because of their implications for trade, capital flows, 
and immigration.  The most rapid growth in the effective number of consumers is in 
ASEAN and India.  For the period 2005-10, the annual growth rate in the effective 
number of consumers is 1.4 percent per annum in ASEAN and 1.7 percent per annum in 
 20
India.  The effective number of consumers is growing much more slowly in China and 
Korea and declining slowly in Japan (Table 6).  
<Table 6 about here> 
 Currently the effective number of producers is growing more rapidly than the 
effective number of consumers except in Japan.  The growth rate is about 2 percent per 
annum in ASEAN and India, 1 percent in greater China, 0.7 percent per annum in Korea, 
and declining by 0.4 percent per annum in Japan. 
 The regional differences in growth rates may seem small but their cumulative 
effect is not because they are persistent.  The coming decades will see a significant shift 
to the West and to the South.  India will supplant China as the largest country in terms of 
effective number of consumers and effective number of producers.  ASEAN’s share will 
grow to approach about 20 percent by 2050.  Japan and Korea will shrink relative to their 
neighbors.  Korea’s share of effective producers will be cut in half by 2050 and Japan’s 
by over 60 percent (Table 7).   
<Table 7 about here> 
 The first dividend depends entirely on changes in the size of the effective work 
force relative to the population (or the effective number of consumers).  Output and 
income per working-age adult are held constant and, hence, the possible effects of 
population growth or changing age structure on the second component in the basic 
growth identity, equation (2), are set aside.  In the next sections we explore the 
possibility that demographic trends are influencing income per effective worker.   
 There are many potentially important channels through which productivity may be 
influenced by population. We will consider two important ones, the accumulation of 
human capital and the accumulation of physical capital, with our emphasis on the latter. 
<B>Human capital formation 
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In Becker’s quantity-quality tradeoff theory (Becker, 1991), one possible explanation for 
fertility decline is that rising incomes lead couples to choose to invest so much more per 
child that they also choose to have fewer children. But within that theory there are also 
other possibilities. Newly available contraceptives raise the price of quantity by 
disconnecting fertility from sex, and could thereby reduce fertility and raise investments 
per child through a complex interaction. New public education or cheaper transportation 
to existing schools could reduce the price of quality, raising investments and reducing 
numbers of children. Mortality decline or economic development would both raise rates 
of return to education and thereby could lead couples to choose quality over quantity. In 
all these cases we would expect to observe an inverse relationship between quantity 
and quality reflecting movements along the hyperbolic budget constraint, although the 
causal forces at work would be quite different.  
 Some theories assign a central role to human capital. For example, Becker, 
Murphy and Tamura (1990) make output of consumption goods proportional to the stock 
of human capital (constant returns), and human capital per child proportional to the 
human capital of the parent generation. If this growth model escapes a Malthusian trap, 
then it converges to a steady state growth path with constant fertility, growing human 
capital per person, and a growing rate of return to human capital. 
 Using data from National Transfer Accounts, we have constructed a measure of 
investment in children’s human capital. We begin with measures of public and private 
spending on children’s health and education at each age. We then sum these across 
age up to 18 years for health and up to 26 years for education. This sum measures total 
human capital investment per child, in a cross-sectional synthetic cohort sense. To 
normalize these measures to facilitate comparison across countries, we then divide by 
the average level of labor income from ages 30 to 49, as before. The natural logarithm of 
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this ratio is then compared to the logarithm of the Total Fertility Rate, which is also a 
cross-sectional synthetic cohort measure.  
 The result is plotted in Figure 8 which shows a strong inverse association across 
countries between human capital investment per child and the level of fertility. The 
elasticity is -1.3 indicating that couples in countries with lower fertility actually spend a 
higher proportion of their labor income on human capital investments than do couples in 
the countries with higher fertility. When countries outside of Asia are included, however, 
this elasticity is indistinguishable from unity (Lee and Mason, 2008). The inverse 
association displayed in Figure 8 can be viewed as a kind of meta budget constraint for 
quantity-quality, an interpretation developed in Lee and Mason (2008).  
<Figure 8 about here> 
 Although Figure 8 shows a cross-sectional rather than a longitudinal relationship, 
it suggests that fertility decline in Asia has been accompanied by a sharp increase in 
investment per child relative to family resources. We would expect an increase of this 
sort to raise labor productivity and contribute powerfully to economic growth, a process 
that is modeled and explored in Lee and Mason (2008). Here, however, we will simply 
note that this rising level of investment may have been rooted in declining fertility and 
must surely have contributed importantly rising labor productivity and economic growth. 
<B>Physical capital accumulation and the second dividend  
A fundamental result that follows from the neo-classical growth model is that for a given 
saving rate, slower population growth or slower growth in the effective labor force leads 
to capital deepening and an increase in output per worker (Solow 1956).  When the 
workforce grows more rapidly, a larger share of current investment must be devoted to 
providing capital to new workers (capital widening).  Less is available for increasing 
capital per worker (capital deepening).  The steady state capital output ratio (K/Y) 
depends only on the saving rate and the rate of population growth (n) and technological 
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change (λ ) (if we ignore depreciation): / /( )K Y s n λ= + .  Any decline in the population 
growth rate leads to a rise in the capital output ratio.  
 This is an important point because the decline in the economic support ratio at 
the end of the demographic transition is a direct result of slower growth in the labor force.  
The first dividend turns negative, but, given a constant saving rate, output per worker will 
rise.  Hence, population aging may lead to higher not lower per capita income.  Indeed, 
this was the conclusion reached by Cutler et al. in their analysis of US aging (Cutler, 
Poterba et al. 1990). 
 Given the objective of this analysis two assumptions underlying the simple neo-
classical growth model are unattractive:  that the saving rate is exogenous and that the 
economy is closed.   
 The lifecycle saving model is widely used to analyze the effects of population and 
other factors on saving (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Modigliani 1988) and capital 
(Tobin 1967).  In the classic lifecycle model, individuals save when they are young and 
dis-save during their retirement years.  Thus, given the age profile of saving, an increase 
in the old-age population leads to lower aggregate saving.  A lower saving rate does not 
unambiguously lead to a decline in capital because of the capital deepening effect.  If n 
and s both decline K/Y may increase or fall. 
 The validity of the lifecycle model is widely debated.  Factors other than the 
desire to provide for old age may motivate saving.  The bequest motive may influence 
saving, in addition to lifecycle saving, but neither we nor others know how the motivation 
to bequeath varies with fertility or other demographic factors. Hurd (1987) finds that the 
bequest behavior of individuals with and without children is similar, suggesting either that 
bequests are mainly unintended or that saving for bequests may be motivated by a 
others besides ones own children (Michael Kuehlwein (1993). Old age support may be 
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provided through public or through familial support.  Models estimated using aggregate 
data support very large effects of age structure (Kelley and Schmidt 1996; Higgins and 
Williamson 1997; Williamson and Higgins 2001).  Models based on survey data suggest 
more modest influences from age structure (Deaton and Paxson 2000).   Simulation 
models imply that age structure has an important effect, but one that is smaller than 
found in aggregate empirical work (Lee, Mason et al. 2000). 
 A potentially important elaboration on the life cycle model incorporates the effects 
of life expectancy on the age profile of saving in addition to the composition of the 
population.  People are living longer and, hence, the duration of their retirement is longer. 
Although a possible response would be to retire at a later age, this has not occurred for 
reasons that are not entirely understood.  Several recent studies have found support for 
a strong positive life expectancy effect on aggregate saving rates (Bloom, Canning et al. 
2003; Kinugasa 2004; Kinugasa and Mason 2007).  Fertility decline may also have a 
significant effect on saving.  A number of studies have concluded that populations with 
high child dependency have lower saving rates (Mason 1987; Higgins 1994; Kelley and 
Schmidt 1996).   
 Transfers also play an important role. In principal, old age consumption can be 
financed entirely through intergenerational transfers as in Samuelson’s consumption-
loan economy (Samuelson 1958).  More realistically intergenerational transfers vary in 
their importance from country to country.  Some countries rely heavily on PAYGO public 
pension programs.  Other countries rely heavily on familial support systems, although 
much less is known about this form of intergenerational transfer and its implication for 
saving. 
 A high percentage of elderly and adult children live together in most Asian 
countries. In Japan and Korea the extent of co-residence has declined substantially in 
recent decades.  Moreover, young adults have much lower expectations about receiving 
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old-age support in the future than was previously the case (Ogawa and Retherford 1993).  
Co-residence, however, does not provide a clear guide to the magnitude or direction of 
familial transfers.   
 National Transfer Accounts provide comprehensive estimates of the importance 
of assets and intergenerational transfers, both public and familial, for a few countries.  
Figure 9 provides estimates for Japan, Taiwan, Thailand and the US of the fraction of 
the lifecycle deficit (consumption less labor income) of those 65 and older funded by 
familial transfers, public transfers, and assets (asset income and dis-saving combined).  
The elderly in Taiwan and Japan are both depend heavily on transfers – covering almost 
two-thirds of their lifecycle deficits.  Taiwan is much more heavily dependent on family 
transfers and Japan on public transfers, but in total they rely heavily on combined 
transfers.  They rely on assets to cover roughly one-third of their lifecycle deficits.  In 
contrast, the US and Thailand depend on transfers for roughly one-third of their lifecycle 
deficit.  Thailand depends more on family transfers and the US on public transfers, but 
their total dependence on combined transfers is similar.  Thailand and the US rely much 
more on assets to cover their lifecycle deficits than do Japan and Taiwan. 
<Figure 9 about here> 
 That US elderly depend more on assets for their retirement than Japanese 
elderly may seem surprising given that Japanese saving rates are higher than US saving 
rates.  The estimates are constructed to insure consistency with NIPA estimates of 
saving.  There are many possible explanations of the seeming inconsistency, however.  
This is a snapshot of the use of assets to support retirement by the elderly.  Aggregate 
saving rates also depend on the saving behavior of non-elderly adults.   Moreover, the 
estimates presented in Figure 9 address only the lifecycle use of saving and not other 
motives, e.g., the bequest motive.    
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 Because comprehensive measures of familial transfers are just becoming 
available, there are no empirical studies of their effect on aggregate saving rates.  But 
Lee, Mason, and Miller (Lee, Mason et al. 2000; Lee, Mason et al. 2002; Lee, Mason et 
al. 2003) use a simulation model to explore their potential effect on aggregate saving.  In 
their analysis of Taiwan, they find that changes in age structure and life expectancy 
alone can account for only a portion of the rise in aggregate saving rates that 
accompanied its demographic transition.  However, demographic change combined with 
a widespread abandonment of familial support systems can explain the boom in saving 
that occurred there.   
 The results presented here make use of a similar simulation model to assess the 
implications of population change for wealth and income.  The details of the model are 
described in Mason and Lee (2007) and only its key features are sketched out here.   
 The economy is assumed to be completely open to international capital flows and 
interest rates so domestic wages and interest rates are unaffected by the supply of 
capital by residents.  The age profile of labor income is fixed, i.e., relative productivity 
and labor force participation rates do not change over time, but the labor income profile 
shifts upward in response to technological growth which is exogenously determined.  
These aspects of the model are relatively conventional.  However, the treatment of 
consumption and saving in the model is distinctive.  
 The model used here implicitly assumes that intergenerational altruism is a 
pervasive feature of the society. We assume that the cross-sectional age-consumption 
profile incorporates those preferences for the well-being, for example, of children and the 
elderly.  The shape of this age profile is assumed not to change over time but it shifts 
upward (or downward) depending on the accumulation of assets, technological progress, 
and changes in the support ratio driven by changing population age structure.  Individual 
consumption is determined only indirectly by the individual’s economic success, since 
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there is extensive sharing of income through public and private intergenerational 
transfers.  Likewise total consumption by a cohort at each age is only indirectly 
influenced by the lifetime economic success of that cohort.  This approach is far more 
consistent with the consumption patterns observed in Asia which in each year are quite 
constant across all adult ages, regardless of the income histories of each generation.5   
 Consumption at older ages is realized through a combination of intergenerational 
transfers and lifecycle saving.  The importance of transfers relative to lifecycle saving is 
exogenously determined and treated in this model as a policy variable or a feature of 
each society.  The economy is subject to an aggregate budget constraint on flows that, 
along with other features of the model, determines the time path of assets, transfer 
wealth and implicit debt, and income.   
 In each period t aggregate wealth is equal to the present value of current and 
future consumption of all individuals who are adults in year t less the present value of 
current and future labor income of all individuals who are adults in year t.  Wealth (W) 
defined in this way is a broad measure of wealth that includes both real assets (A) and 
the present value of current and future net transfers to year t adults, called transfer 
wealth (T).  Transfer wealth consists of two components:  child transfer wealth and 
pension transfer wealth.  Child transfer wealth is the present value of transfers from year 
t adults to living dependent children and to children who will be born in the future.  Child 
transfer wealth is negative and it is equal to the present value of the future cost of 
children to those who are adults in year t.   
 Pension transfer wealth is the present value of net transfers that year t adults will 
receive from year t children and from future generations.  These transfers may be 
familial transfers or public transfers.  Pension transfer wealth is the counterpart of implicit 
                                                
5 Models based on the standard lifecycle theory or the Ramsey approach produce broadly similar 
results.  
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debt – the transfer wealth of those who are adults today is equal in magnitude to the 
implicit debt of future generations.  Implicit debt as calculated here is not limited to public 
transfers programs, e.g., PAYGO pension programs.  It includes all intergenerational 
transfers whether public or private (familial).   
 The impact of demographic change on capital accumulation and economic 
growth depends on the extent to which the economy in question relies on pension 
transfer wealth versus capital accumulation to support consumption in old age.  We treat 
this as an exogenous variable rooted in each country’s institutions, but changeable 
through policy. Thus we specify the relative shares of assets and pension transfer wealth.  
Two sets of results are presented below.  In one a very low percentage of pension 
wealth is transfer wealth (35%) with assets accounting for the other 65%.  In the 
alternative simulation, transfer wealth is 65% of pension wealth and assets are 35%.   
 Before we turn to the results it should be clearly stated that the model is not 
intended to be a complete and comprehensive model of the economy.  Its purpose is 
quite specific to showing how demographic changes are likely to influence wealth and 
assets, and with what implication for economic growth.  There are three ways in which 
demographic change will influence wealth in our model.  First, changes in the support 
ratio influence consumption at each age.  If the support ratio is high, perhaps due to low 
fertility, then higher consumption at every age is possible.  Anticipated higher 
consumption at old ages means that more wealth (assets plus pension transfer wealth) 
must be held at every age to finance that consumption.  Second, people are living longer.  
To support consumption over an extended period of retirement, they must accumulate 
more wealth during their working years.  Third, given the age profile of wealth holdings, 
changes in the population age structure influence aggregate wealth.  Up to a point 
wealth rises with age and, hence, a population concentrated in the late working years 
and early retirement years has greater wealth, in one form or the other.   
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<B>Simulation Results for ASEAN 
Simulated net saving rates in ASEAN for 1950 to 2050 are shown in Figure 10.   
Comparative results will be presented in the next section.  Productivity growth is 
assumed to be 2 percent per annum here and in all other results presented.  The high IG 
transfer simulation gives the saving rate if 65% of the wealth required to support 
consumption in old age is provided through public and familial transfer programs.  The 
low IG transfer simulation gives the saving rate if intergenerational transfers cover only 
35% of the consumption needed during retirement.   
<Figure 10 about here> 
 Changes in age structure lead to a rise and then to a decline in net saving rates.  
One might incorrectly infer from the pattern that population aging is leading to a decline 
in saving rates, but this is not correct.  Saving rates are rising in anticipation of 
population aging.  The change in saving rates is transitory, however.  As the population 
stabilizes at an older age structure, saving rates decline to levels closer to their pre-
transition level.   
 Saving rates are strongly influenced by the size of intergenerational transfers.  If 
transfers play a modest role in supporting the consumption of older adults, changes in 
age structure have a very substantial effect on net saving rates which rise from about 3 
percent of national income in 1950 to peak at 23 percent of national income in 2010.   
 If intergenerational transfers play a dominant role in providing support to the 
elderly, then the effect of age structure on saving is moderate.  Net national saving rates 
rise from 2 percent in 1950 to peak at around 8 percent in 1985 before gradually 
declining.   
 The impact of age structure on assets is substantial (Figure 11).  In 1950 the 
ratio of total assets to total labor income is about 0.3 for both intergenerational transfer 
systems.  By 1990 assets have increased to 1.5 times labor income for the low IG 
 30
transfer case and to 1.2 time labor income in the high IG transfer case.  After 1990 the 
systems diverge with assets relative to labor income increasing to 7 in 2050 for the low 
IG transfer case, but only to 2 in 2050 for the high IG transfer case.  Total wealth in 2050 
in the low IG transfer case is also 350% greater than in the high IG transfer case in 
2050.6 
<Figure 11 about here> 
 As compared with 1950, changes in age structure lead to about a 30% increase 
in consumption per equivalent consumer in 2030 given the high IG transfer policy 
(Figure 12).  Using the low IG transfer policy, changes in age structure lead to an 
increase in consumption per equivalent consumer of about 50% in 2050.  Note that the 
higher consumption after 2025 for the low IG transfer policy comes with a cost.  The 
higher saving rates and lower consumption rates necessary lead to lower consumption 
between 1995 and 2020 under the low IG transfer policy than under the high IG transfer 
policy.  Consumption remains permanently higher under the low IG transfer policy.  Over 
the next 100 years (not shown) consumption is 20 percent higher on average given the 
low IG transfer policy. In a closed economy these differences would be larger.  
<Figure 12 about here> 
 The simulations presume that the economic lifecycle itself does not respond to 
changes in age structure and, hence, the gains (or losses) in consumption are equally 
shared by all age groups.  Of course, other outcomes are possible.  The elderly might 
flex its political power and increase its consumption relative to younger generations.  Or 
young generations may rebel if IG transfers are too burdensome to the detriment of the 
elderly.  
<B>Comparative Results 
                                                
6 Because a small open economy assumption is used labor income growth is the same in either 
case.  The greater wealth is accumulated as foreign assets in the low IG transfer economy.  
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The results presented in this section focus more narrowly on two periods:  1995-2005 
and 2005-2020.  The effects of changes in age structure on saving rates depend on the 
importance of intergenerational transfers to the elderly (Table 8).  Given low reliance on 
intergenerational transfers, net national saving rates reach very high peaks in 1995 in 
greater China, Japan, and Korea.  In these countries saving rates decline to intermediate 
levels in 2005 and to much lower levels in 2025.   In India and ASEAN, the saving 
effects are somewhat more modest and are delayed reflecting the slower and later 
changes in age structure.   
<Table 8 about here> 
 If intergenerational transfers play a very important role, the effects of age 
structure on saving are muted.    
 Accumulated assets are reported in Table 9.  Age structure has a substantial 
influence on the lifecycle demand for assets if intergenerational transfers are low.  In this 
case, the ratio of assets to labor income in 1995 ranges from 1.1 given the demography 
of India to 10.2 given the demography of Japan.  The demand for lifecycle assets grows 
in all cases between 1995 and 2005 and between 2005 and 2025.  By 2025, Korea is 
approaching the simulated level of assets for Japan.  Percentage growth rates are very 
strong in ASEAN and India.  Between 1995 and 2025, assets relative to labor income 
increase three-fold in both cases.   
<Table 9 about here> 
 The complexities of the relationship between age structure and consumption 
growth are apparent in Table 10.  Consumption growth changes because of changes in 
income per effective consumer and changes in the ratio of consumption to national 
income that underlie the second dividend.  If the consumption ratio changes very little, 
the trend in consumption is dominated by changes in the support ratio, i.e., the first 
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dividend.  Thus, consumption per equivalent consumer will grow more rapidly during the 
dividend period and then decline as population aging dominates the support ratio. 
<Table 10 about here> 
 However, if there is a strong response in the consumption ratio the outcome is 
more complex.  Rapid accumulation of capital is realized through a decline in the 
consumption ratio and slow growth in consumption per effective consumer.   As the 
consumption ratio rises from low levels, however, consumption growth can be very rapid.   
 Consumption growth in ASEAN shows this pattern.  Given a strong saving 
response (low intergenerational transfers), consumption growth is slow in 1995-2005, 
but very substantial in 2005-2025.  In contrast, given a modest saving response (high 
intergenerational transfers), consumption growth is more rapid in 1995-2005 and 
dissipates in 2005-2025.   
 The situation in India is somewhat different.  In 1995-2005 consumption is 
actually declining modestly (relative to productivity gains) as a result of a decline in the 
share of national income consumed.  Consumption rebounds after 2005.  For the two 
decades taken as a whole consumption growth rates are the same given either policy, 
but more detailed results show that consumption growth is substantially more rapid given 
the high saving scenario after 2015.    
 Greater China, Japan, and Korea are in similar situations given a low level of 
intergenerational transfers.  For 1995-2005 consumption growth is very rapid – ranging 
from 3 percent to nearly 6 percent above the assumed rate of productivity growth of 2 
percent per year.  During this period saving rates are declining from the high levels of 
1995 and earlier and income growth is strong leading to rapid growth in consumption.  
After 2005, consumption growth rates are well above those possible in the absence of a 
strong saving response. 
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 A note of caution is in order here.  The very large simulated effects are 
conditioned on low intergenerational transfers.  The evidence from Japan, Taiwan, and 
preliminary estimates for Korea not presented here indicates that intergenerational 
transfers to the elderly were closer to the high IG transfer scenario than the low IG 
transfer scenario.  Hence, the second dividends realized in East Asia were probably well 
below the possible gains that could have been realized.  Estimates of the contribution of 
changes in age structure to growth in per capita income in East Asian range from about 
one-third to one-quarter of actual growth (Bloom 1998; Mason 2001).  The simulated 
impact on consumption is substantially greater than the simulated effect on per capita 
income, because of the rapid increase in consumption rates for Korea, Japan, and 
greater China.    
<A>IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
Declining mortality followed by declining fertility leads to a roller-coaster of changes in 
dependency, with initial increases in child dependency, then a period of improving 
support ratios spanning about 50 years and generating the first dividend, and finally 
population aging. Asian countries have all entered the first dividend phase, with India 
and ASEAN midway through it, China and Korea near its end, and Japan well past it and 
into population aging.  
 Population aging is the inevitable last stage of the demographic transition, and 
the costs of supporting the consumption of a large dependent elderly population, 
reflected in falling support ratios, lead to concerns by policy makers, the media and the 
public. The declining support ratios due to population aging are a predictable and very 
concrete aspect of the complex constellation of economically important changes 
occurring over the course of the demographic transition, and it is therefore tempting to 
view population aging separately from these other changes that result from the same 
basic causes. Earlier we have highlighted the relation of the demographic transition and 
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population aging to increased investment in human capital and physical capital. Both 
raise productivity and incomes far more significantly than declining support ratios 
diminish them.  
 The changes in age structure that accompany the demographic transition are 
emphasized here because of their importance particularly in countries which have 
experienced rapid fertility decline in East Asia and elsewhere.  The post-World War II 
baby booms of the US and other Western countries have also produced significant 
changes in age structure and demographic dividends.  These are qualitatively similar to 
those experienced in East Asia but smaller in scale.  Although Japan experienced its 
own post-war baby boom, it was short-lived with little discernable effect. 
 We will now briefly consider some policy issues related to these themes. 
 As noted, population aging will lead to substantial declines in support ratios from 
their peaks at the culmination of the first dividend phase of the transition. Assuming that 
the shapes of the age profiles of consumption and labor income do not change, we can 
calculate the size of these declines. In Japan, the support ratio will decline by 25% 
between 2008 and 2050, or at .7% per year.  In Korea the decline will be by 22%, or .6% 
per year. In China the decline will be only 14%, and in India and ASEAN the support 
ratio will rise. 
 The projected declines in support ratios have occasioned deep concerns in many 
countries, since they imply an increased dependency burden on the working age 
population and threaten fiscal instability. They depend on both demographic trends and 
on the age patterns of consumption and labor income. Some governments have 
considered policies to reduce the pace and depth of future population aging by raising 
fertility. The past experience of European nations with pronatalist policies has not been 
encouraging in this regard, however. Another possibility is immigration, but this seems 
unlikely to play a significant role in ameliorating population aging in the Asian context, 
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since Asia is a major net supplier of migrants to other parts of the world, and the more 
highly industrialized countries like Japan and Korea have a history of highly restrictive 
immigration policies (Mason et al, 2008). 
 Another way to reduce the projected declines in support ratios is to modify the 
age patterns of consumption and labor income in a way that raises support ratios for a 
given demographic structure. Policies to encourage later retirement have not drawn 
much attention in Asia; indeed many countries have mandatory retirement laws (see 
Mason et al, 2008), but later retirement could moderate the decline in support ratios, as 
could increases in female labor supply. The incentive structure created by public pension 
programs can have an important effect on retirement behavior (Gruber and Wise, 1999) 
and the design of any new pension programs could be shaped accordingly. Turning to 
the consumption age profiles, Japan (Ogawa et al, in this conference) and Western 
industrial countries have experienced disproportional increases in consumption by the 
elderly relative to younger adults in recent decades, and such changes exacerbate the 
costs of population aging and its effects on support ratios. Some of this increase in old 
age consumption appears to be driven directly by the structure of public transfers to the 
elderly for pensions and health care. It is possible that declines in elder co-residence 
with adult children are an in part an indirect consequence of these public transfers, and 
this decline may also have contributed to the increases in old age consumption by 
reducing family level income pooling. 
 The great increase in human capital investment over the course of the 
demographic transition has surely played an important role in economic development. 
Both theory and empirical analysis suggest that the increased human capital investment 
is closely tied to fertility decline and to a lesser degree to mortality decline. However, the 
direction of causality is not entirely clear, leaving some uncertainty about whether policy 
 36
driven changes in fertility, for example through pronatalist policies, would lead to 
opposite changes in human capital.  
 In the global context, East Asia stands out as investing particularly heavily in 
children’s human capital, but in our analysis (Lee and Mason, 2008) the level of 
investment is to be expected, given the exceptionally low fertility in East Asia. The strong 
role for private spending on education, complementing public education, is also 
distinctive in East Asia. Given this already strong pattern of human capital investment, 
the main policy concern appears to be that new policies not interfere with this existing 
tendency. It is also possible that the demand for a high level of human capital investment 
is itself a driving force behind the very low levels of fertility in East Asia.  
 Our final point is the need for governments and societies to consider carefully the 
arrangements supporting consumption by the elderly, and potential changes in these 
arrangements. Should continuation of familial support for the elderly be encouraged by 
policy? Or should governments move toward public pension programs, and should any 
new pension programs be funded or PAYGO?  
 A switch from familial support to public PAYGO pensions may entail less change 
than it appears, since both accumulate implicit debt as the population ages, and both 
entail increasing dependency burdens on the working age adult. However, public sector 
pension programs spread the support costs more evenly across the population while 
altering the incentives of the elderly and adult children in various ways. In either case, it 
should be kept in mind that the transfer wealth generated by familial support or PAYGO 
pensions is likely to substitute for capital in individual’s retirement plans. Transfer 
programs of these kinds likely diminish the promotion of capital accumulation by 
population aging, the second dividend. Policies that encourage life cycle saving and 
personal retirement accounts, whether public or private, would enable countries to 
harness the power of population aging to generate increased capital per worker.  
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 There are tradeoffs between the benefits and drawbacks of familial, PAYGO, and 
funded old age support programs, and each society may choose a different mix. The key 
point is that most but not all of the countries of Asia are still at an early enough stage in 
the transition that they have options that are no longer open to Japan and the other 
industrial nations. For these countries to transit from their PAYGO programs to funded 
programs would entail very heavy costs amounting to a year or several years worth of 
GDP. For countries earlier in the transition, that do not yet have comprehensive PAYGO 
programs, steps to encourage individual responsibility for own retirement are much more 
feasible and less painful.  
 Population aging and the forces leading to it produce not only frightening 
declines in support ratios, but also very substantial increases in productivity and per 
capita income. Low fertility and low mortality are associated with large increases in 
human capital investment in children, and they also cause large increases in the 
accumulation of physical capital. Together, these positive changes will likely outweigh 
the problems of declining support ratios. Population aging brings economic benefits as 
well as costs, and we should view this package of consequences as a whole while 
developing policies to minimize the costs and amplify the benefits.  
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Table 1.  Population Growth Rates (%), 1950-2050. 
  1950-55 1975-80 2000-05 2025-10 2045-50 
ASEAN 2.10 2.14 1.39 0.69 0.19 
Brunei Darussalam 5.56 3.65 2.29 1.28 0.78 
Cambodia 2.15 -1.01 1.76 1.26 0.77 
Indonesia 1.67 2.20 1.31 0.61 0.10 
Lao PDR 2.73 1.30 1.62 1.08 0.50 
Malaysia 2.72 2.32 1.95 0.87 0.41 
Myanmar 1.96 2.19 0.89 0.47 0.01 
Philippines 2.99 2.70 2.08 1.09 0.50 
Singapore 4.90 1.30 1.49 0.38 -0.37 
Thailand 2.84 2.08 0.76 0.12 -0.27 
Viet Nam 1.87 1.99 1.45 0.75 0.21 
CHINA + 1.90 1.49 0.67 0.17 -0.32 
China, People's Rep. of 1.87 1.48 0.67 0.17 -0.32 
Hong Kong, China 4.64 2.73 1.15 0.54 0.11 
Taiwan 3.63 1.95 0.54 -0.06 -0.89 
India 1.73 2.30 1.62 0.79 0.32 
Japan 1.43 0.93 0.14 -0.56 -0.78 
Korea, Rep. of 2.55 1.55 0.46 -0.25 -0.89 
Note:  Values for ASEAN and China + are for the combined populations not simple average across 
the group members.  Source:  United Nations Population Prospects, 2006.  Taiwan:  see text.   
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Table 2.  Percentage of Population Under Age 20, 1950-2050. 
  1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 
ASEAN 49.0 53.0 41.8 30.3 24.1 
Brunei Darussalam 46.0 50.5 40.0 29.6 24.7 
Cambodia 52.6 52.8 54.3 39.0 29.4 
Indonesia 50.0 52.3 40.6 28.9 23.6 
Lao PDR 49.5 54.3 54.1 38.7 26.9 
Malaysia 50.4 53.2 43.6 31.7 24.5 
Myanmar 44.3 51.7 40.4 27.9 23.0 
Philippines 53.7 55.4 48.4 37.3 26.6 
Singapore 50.0 45.7 28.1 16.4 15.5 
Thailand 53.0 53.3 32.1 24.4 21.4 
Viet Nam 41.9 53.8 44.1 29.4 23.1 
CHINA + 43.4 48.8 32.8 23.7 20.5 
China, People's Rep. of 43.3 48.9 32.9 23.8 20.5 
Hong Kong, China 41.2 42.3 23.7 15.7 15.2 
Taiwan 52.5 47.4 29.7 20.6 18.6 
India 47.7 50.6 45.1 33.3 24.4 
Japan 45.8 31.5 20.5 15.5 15.3 
Korea, Rep. of 51.7 50.3 28.9 16.8 14.2 
Source:  United Nations Population Prospects, 2006.  Taiwan:  see text.  
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Table 3.  Percentage of Population Age 20-64, 1950-2050. 
  1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 
ASEAN 47.2 43.4 53.3 60.6 58.3 
Brunei Darussalam 49.2 46.0 57.0 62.8 60.5 
Cambodia 44.7 44.4 42.7 56.0 60.9 
Indonesia 46.1 44.4 54.5 62.1 57.8 
Lao PDR 48.4 42.7 42.5 56.5 62.5 
Malaysia 44.6 43.0 52.5 59.6 59.2 
Myanmar 52.3 44.0 54.1 62.9 58.1 
Philippines 42.7 41.6 48.0 56.3 60.4 
Singapore 47.6 50.1 64.8 60.8 51.7 
Thailand 43.8 43.1 61.2 60.7 55.3 
Viet Nam 53.9 41.3 50.5 61.9 57.7 
CHINA + 52.1 46.8 60.3 62.5 55.7 
China, People's Rep. of 52.2 46.7 60.3 62.5 55.8 
Hong Kong, China 56.3 52.3 65.4 62.6 52.1 
Taiwan 45.0 49.2 62.1 62.3 55.5 
India 49.2 46.0 50.3 58.9 61.1 
Japan 49.3 60.6 62.2 55.1 47.0 
Korea, Rep. of 45.2 46.1 63.7 63.6 50.6 
Source:  United Nations Population Prospects, 2006.  Taiwan:  see text.   
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Table 4.  Percentage of Population 65 and Older, 1950-2050. 
  1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 
ASEAN 3.8 3.6 4.9 9.1 17.7 
Brunei Darussalam 4.9 3.5 2.9 7.6 14.8 
Cambodia 2.7 2.8 2.9 5.0 9.8 
Indonesia 4.0 3.3 4.9 9.0 18.6 
Lao PDR 2.2 3.1 3.4 4.7 10.6 
Malaysia 5.1 3.7 3.9 8.7 16.3 
Myanmar 3.4 4.2 5.5 9.3 18.9 
Philippines 3.6 3.1 3.5 6.5 12.9 
Singapore 2.4 4.1 7.2 22.8 32.8 
Thailand 3.2 3.6 6.7 14.9 23.3 
Viet Nam 4.2 4.9 5.5 8.7 19.2 
CHINA + 4.4 4.4 6.9 13.8 23.8 
China, People's Rep. of 4.5 4.4 6.8 13.7 23.7 
Hong Kong, China 2.5 5.4 11.0 21.7 32.6 
Taiwan 2.4 3.4 8.1 17.2 25.9 
India 3.1 3.4 4.6 7.7 14.5 
Japan 4.9 7.9 17.2 29.5 37.7 
Korea, Rep. of 3.0 3.6 7.4 19.6 35.1 
Source:  United Nations Population Prospects, 2006.  Taiwan:  see text.   
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Table 5.  Annual net migration rate (net migrants per thousand population) 
            
  
1950-
1955 
1955-
1960 
1960-
1965 
1965-
1970 
1970-
1975 
1975-
1980 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
ASEAN            
Brunei Darussalam 18.0 13.6 11.0 17.3 13.6 10.9 2.5 4.7 2.6 2.2 2.0 
Cambodia -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -12.8 -3.6 — 3.4 2.8 1.3 0.2 
Indonesia -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 
Lao PDR -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -13.2 -2.1 0.0 -1.4 -3.5 -4.2 
Malaysia 1.9 1.3 1.0 -1.5 -1.6 1.5 -0.3 1.8 3.0 4.5 1.2 
Myanmar — — — — — — -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 -0.4 
Philippines — — — -0.7 -1.1 -1.6 -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.5 -2.2 
Singapore 15.0 11.6 1.1 0.4 1.3 0.9 11.7 9.7 15.4 19.6 9.6 
Thailand — — — — 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.7 0.7 
Viet Nam — — — — — -3.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 
China +            
China -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 — -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
China, Hong Kong SAR 17.4 13.0 9.5 -5.0 7.3 15.1 5.1 0.9 10.1 9.3 8.7 
Taiwan — — 0.1 -0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
            
Japan -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Republic of Korea 5.4 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 
India -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
Sources:  UN 2007 World Population Prospects; Taiwan-Fuchien Demographic Fact Book, various years. 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Annual Growth Rates (%), Effective Numbers of 
Consumers and Producers   
        
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Effective Consumers       
ASEAN 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 
China + 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 
India 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 
Japan 0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 
Korea 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.1 
        
Effective Producers       
ASEAN 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.0 
China + 2.4 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 -0.2 
India 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 
Japan 0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 
Korea 2.2 1.6 1.2 0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 
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Table 7.  Distribution of Effective 
Consumers and Producers. 
    
 1990 2025 2050 
Effective Consumers  
ASEAN 16.4 18.0 19.0 
China + 45.3 39.5 36.0 
India 31.7 37.8 41.4 
Japan 4.9 3.3 2.6 
Korea 1.7 1.3 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
Effective Producers   
ASEAN 15.4 18.1 19.1 
China + 47.2 40.5 34.3 
India 29.9 37.0 43.5 
Japan 5.7 3.0 2.2 
Korea 1.8 1.4 0.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 8.  Net Saving/National Income (%), Country Groupings. 
 IG trans share low (0.35) IG trans share high (0.65) 
  1995 2005 2025 1995 2005 2025 
ASEAN 13.6 21.5 18.5 7.5 7.3 4.9 
China + 32.4 21.6 6.5 7.6 5.3 2.8 
India 7.0 15.0 21.6 7.1 7.6 5.7 
Japan 38.6 15.9 3.5 4.5 2.9 1.4 
Korea 52.9 32.4 2.6 7.9 4.7 1.4 
 
 
Table 9.  Assets/Labor Income, Country Groupings. 
 IG trans share low (0.35) IG trans share high (0.65) 
  1995 2005 2025 1995 2005 2025 
ASEAN 1.6 2.4 5.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 
China + 2.6 4.4 7.1 1.5 1.7 2.0 
India 1.1 1.5 3.9 1.0 1.2 1.7 
Japan 10.2 13.6 14.9 2.5 2.6 2.8 
Korea 5.2 8.9 12.7 2.1 2.2 2.3 
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Table 10.  Annual Growth in Consumption Due to Age Structure (%), Country 
Groupings. 
 IG trans share low (0.35) IG trans share high (0.65) 
  1995-2005 2005-2025 1995-2005 2005-2025 
ASEAN 0.3 1.2 0.9 0.6 
China + 3.0 1.4 1.0 0.1 
India -0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 
Japan 4.1 0.5 0.0 -0.3 
Korea 5.9 2.6 1.0 0.0 
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Figure 1. A Classic Demographic Transition, India 1890 to 2100, Historical, 
Projected and Simulated 
 
Note: The simulation is based on a fertility transition in which the total fertility rate 
follows a quintic path declining from 5.9 in 1953 to 2.1 in 2025 and a mortality 
transition in which a Lee-Carter mortality index follows a sinusoidal path as e(0) 
increases from 24.7 in 1900 to 80.0 in 2100. Actual India data for the period 
1891-1901 to 1941-1951 are taken from Bhat (1989). Actual and projected data 
are taken from UN (2001). 
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Figure 2.  Birth Rates and Death Rates for Selected Asian Countries, 1950-55, 1975-80, 
2000-05, 2025-30, and 2045-50.  RNI is rate of natural increase per 1000 persons.  
ASEAN is a simple average of country values. Source:  Based on data from United 
Nations Population Division 2007.   
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Figure 3.  Regional Distribution of Population for Major Country Groupings, 2000.  
Source:  See text.  
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Figure 4.  Regional Distribution of Population for Major Country Groupings, 2050.  
Source:  See text. 
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Figure 5.  The Economic Lifecycle, Developing World Profile.  Source:  (Lee and Mason 
2007). 
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Figure 6.  Economic Support Ratio, Country Groupings, 1950-2050.  Source:  Calculated 
by authors.  
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Figure 7.  The First Demographic Dividend (%), 1990-2025, Country Groupings.  Source:  
Calculated by authors.   
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Figure 8. Total Human Capital Spending per Child on Health up to 18 and Education up 
to 26, Public and Private, Divided by Average Labor Income Ages 30-49. 
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Figure 9.  Proportion of lifecycle deficit of those 65 and older funded through familial 
transfers, public transfers, and asset-based reallocations (asset income and dis-saving).  
Selected Asian countries and the US.  Computational details available at 
www.ntaccounts.org.  Estimates from the National Transfer Accounts Project.  Japan 
estimates constructed by Naohiro Ogawa, Rikiya Matsukura, and Chawla Amonthep.  
Thai estimates constructed by Amonthep.  Information about Taiwan and US estimates 
available in Mason, Lee, et al. (forthcoming).  
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Figure 10.  Net Saving Rate Simulations, ASEAN population, 1950-2050.  Low (high) IG 
transfer assumes that transfer wealth is 35% (65%) of pension wealth.   
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Figure 11.  Assets/Labor Income, ASEAN population, 1950-2050.  Low (high) IG transfer 
assumes that transfer wealth is 35% (65%) of lifecycle pension wealth. 
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Figure 12. Consumption index, ASEAN, 1950-2050, Low (high) IG transfer assumes that 
transfer wealth is 35% (65%) of lifecycle pension wealth.  Consumption index equals 100 
in 1950.  Effect of age structure only; effect of productivity increases not included.  
 
 
 
 
 
